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It has been just one year since the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
mandated a minimum of 1500 total flight hours for all part 121 pilots and the 
implementation of the corresponding 3-tier restricted Airline Transport Pilot 
(ATP) program based on reduced flight hours. So, how did we get here and are 
there any off-the-shelf alternatives to the three tiers to help get pilots into the left 
seat sooner? 
 
In response to the 2009 Colgan Air Mishap in Buffalo and the subsequent 
congressional mandate, beginning August 2013, the FAA directed that all Part 
121 air carrier pilots must possess an ATP certificate, historically earned at 1,500 
total flight hours. No longer would a 250-hour commercially certificated pilot be 
able to fly right seat for the regional or major carriers.  Also, in response to this 
accident, beginning January 2014, the FAA mandated more restrictive minimum 
crew rest policies.  
 
However, responding to industry concerns about a pilot shortage caused 
by this change, the FAA created three restricted-ATP tiers. All former military-
trained pilots could apply for their Restricted Airline Transport Pilot (R-ATP) at 
750 total hours. All baccalaureate university professional flight graduates with   
60+ aviation semester hours from the FAA’s eight specified academic categories 
could apply at 1,000 total hours. Students with an associates or bachelor degree 
with 30+ aviation semester hours could apply at 1,250 total hours. In all three 
cases, ATP candidates must have a minimum of 50 multi-engine hours and 
complete a newly designed ATP training course prior to taking this check ride.   
 
Having just passed the first anniversary of the FAAs 1500-hour rule 
implementation and given the pilot shortfall causing regional carriers to park 
aircraft, it is time to consider alternatives that meet both the concerns of congress 
and the concerns of the Colgan Air mishap families.  The fact that the accident 
cause factors had nothing to do with aircrew total flight time or the lack of an 
ATP, is no longer relevant.  The aviation industry and aviation educators are stuck 
with the task of minimizing the impact of this new law. 
 
To my point, at a recent Aviation Accreditation Board International 
(AABI) convention in Nashville, TN, the director of the Regional Airline 
Association (RAA) announced that the next Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 
Committee (ARC) was tasked to discuss the 1500-hour rule, find solutions to its 
impact on the airline industry, and that “nothing was to be left off the table.” The 
RAA representative also discussed the role of the Colgan Air family watchdog 
group of lawyers that were ever vigilant to make sure that the FAA did not “roll 
back” the new Restricted ATP requirements. However, both the FAA and the 
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Colgan Air mishap watchdog committee have accepted that a military trained 
pilot can take their R-ATP ride at 750 total hours. It is my opinion that the 
military trained pilot was deemed “deserving” of a lower minimum due to the 
structure and compressed intensity in their approach to flight training and 
organizational procedures.  
 
What constitutes a military style curriculum?  In a word “structure, 
structure, structure” and many University Aviation Association (UAA) 
universities already have such structured programs. For example, in response to 
the Colgan Air-driven changes, a regionally accredited U.S. university, with a 
16,000 total student body and 200 aviation students, recently retooled its entire 
aviation proflight program. The goal was to leverage the structure-based lessons 
learned by military aviation organizations to both improve aircrew training and 
safety, and to reduce historic excessive times-to-train. 
 
In short, their entire collegiate flight-training model was transformed into 
a military version of General Aviation (GA) flight training by following the Naval 
Aviation Training Command (NATC) template. All flight lesson grade sheets 
were reformatted into NATC Aviation Training Forms (ATFs) and associated 
Maneuver Description Guides (MDGs) were created. Each MDG, that is, Private 
single engine land (SEL), Private multi-engine land (MEL), Instrument SEL/MEL 
etc., contained step-by-step instructions for every graded event listed on each 
respective ATF. 
 
Additionally, they created military style: 
• Triply redundant maintenance practices with quality assurance (QA) 
inspections. Every squawk is corrected by an FAA certified Airframe 
and Powerplant (A&P), checked by another A&P Inspection Authority 
(IA), and finally a post maintenance test flight is flown by the 
maintenance check pilot.  
• Quarterly safety stand downs to roll back complacency, 
• Aircrew and flight training standardization boards, 
• Aircrew Review Boards (ARB) to evaluate student program 
continuance after demonstrating problems with aeronautical mastery. 
• New staff managers in the organizational structure, i.e. Aircraft 
Maintenance and Aviation Safety. 
• Aviation safety board formed from the most senior and experienced 
flight instructors to watch over and implement the university’s safety 
management system (SMS). 
• Three-part crew rest policy that limits all pilots, student and instructor, 
to a 6 day work week. While not implemented by the FAA until 
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January 2014, but because crew rest was a contributing factor in this 
accident, this regional program established a university crew rest 
policy.  All aircrew are required to stand down one day in seven. The 
crew day is limited to 12 hours. So, a student beginning his/her day at 
8 a.m. for an academic class, cannot fly after 8 p.m. that evening. 
Finally, all aircrew are required to observe 9 hours of uninterrupted 
crew rest (dinner/sleep/breakfast) between each flying day. 
 
In conclusion, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. Many U.S. collegiate 
aviation programs are already using military training models, such as the one 
discussed above. Perhaps this is because it was the military that first used aviation 
extensively during WWI and before there were widespread commercial 
applications. Or, perhaps it was because many of the early commercial pilots were 
former military pilots. In any case, the precedent has been set by the FAA, the 
Colgan Air families, and their watch dog lawyer groups, that a commercial pilot 
trained using military training techniques can be awarded a 750-hour restricted 
ATP. While this only represents a 250-hour reduction from the 1000-hour R-ATP, 
every hour reduction will help get new pilots into the right seat that much faster. 
 
Recommendations: 
• That the UAA membership, the regional airlines, and the major 
airlines press the FAA to reduce all 60-credit hour military style BS 
aviation programs, from their current 1000 hours, to the 750 total 
hours assigned to the military trained pilot R-ATP category. 
• That the UAA membership push the regional and major airlines to 
consider providing scholarships for the aviation students they select as 
part of their college “pathway” programs. Inadequate funding 
represents the number one cause of flight student’s attrition at most 
universities. Many regional carriers have already begun interviewing 
university aviation students with their instrument rating as part of these 
pathway programs. Pending a successful interview, the regionals are 
offering them first officer jobs on the spot, contingent upon degree 
completion and the attainment of 1000-hours, along with the other 
ATP requirements. With some form of a “payback” contract, this one 
action could increase university proflight graduation rates by 30-50%. 
And… coupled with a reduction to 750 total hours, these graduates 
would be flight deck-ready 250 hours sooner. 
 
Ralph Gibbs is the Eastern Kentucky University (EKU) Director of Aviation and 
is also a retired USMC aviator. 
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